Epistemic relativism / 认知相对主义

本文是摘自 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 关于 Relativism 的 Epistemic relativism 章节,由于版权问题,原始内容请参见:

Baghramian, Maria and Carter, J. Adam, “Relativism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/relativism/.

有时间的话会尽量翻译完。

4.4 认知相对主义

研究显示,人们更愿意用“相对主义”的思维方式去认定一个东西是知识以及去认可一个论证过程。“什么是知识?怎样的笃信是理性的?”——认知相对主义的核心正是在于如何对这些问题建立标准上——在该主义看来,这些标准是会随着特定的认知和文化框架改变的,这些标准本身事实上并没有我们想象的那样通用和固定。认知相对主义做了三个关键的假设:

  1. 认知论上的说理体系本身是一个相对的框架。单纯问一个“笃信”是不是绝对“有理据”本身是没有意义的——问这种问题必须基于一个特定的认知体系,(这也隐含了对客观性的怀疑?)
  2. 事实上有很多可以相互替换的,互相不兼容的认知体系。
  3. 我们如果要论证其中一个认知体系优于另一个,就不可避免的需要进行循环论证(当然,循环论证本身是难以让人接受的)。

Paul在撰写他批评相对主义的文章里提到,认知相对主义者致力于建立一个“同等有效体系”的学说——即“存在很多根本上不同的、互不兼容、却有都挺有道理的方式去认识这个世界,科学只是其中之一罢了” 相对主义这的核心论点在于我们要么狂热的决的其中一种认知体系好于所有其它的,要么就应当接受所有认知体系都同等合理。

对于相对主义而言,一个重要的问题就是如何区分,如何剥离不同的认知体系呢?直觉上,我们觉得是那些会(随系统改变而)改变的、相互排斥的认知“核心原则”,最基本的需要相信的东西,必要的预设(就是Wittgenstein 说的基础预设)一个简单并且广泛传用的例子就是笃信科学和笃信宗教这两个系统。举例来说,Boghossian做了一个专题研究,讲的是关于伽利略和Cardinal Bellarmine的关于行星运动的争论——他们两个人分别用了两套非常著名的认知框架(Rorty在他的文章里称之为网格框架)来解释。相对主义者认为事实上很难说起哥白尼的日心说和过去的地心说哪一个是被正确论证的——“毕竟我们很难说哪一个绝对的事实可以证明另一样东西”(Boghossian)从另一面看,反相对主义者正是想说明这些思想是很蠢很没道理的。

Boghossian 一直因他对相对主义的论述备受批评。其中来自Crispin Wright的批评值得注意。他关注到了Boghossian对于相对主义者的归纳中的第一条(见上文)说如果像“证据E可以体现笃信B的合理性”这样的说法可以是对的的话,那么这些说法必须依据某一个认知系统,这个系统里如果I和S可接受,才能有证据E可以合理化B。Boghossian在对相对主义进行了上述归纳后又提出,相对主义者可能有很多种方式来攻击“证据E可以体现笃信B的合理性”这样的表述,但最终他们会觉得并没有什么自成体系的方法去说明她应该接受/拒绝哪一种认知体系。Boghossian最后总结到,上述问题正是因为相对主义者找不到这样一种自成体系的办法来让他们从多余一个备选项中选出一个完善的认知系统——他们甚至不能假设有一些认知上的原则是通用的(包括推理、归纳、对经验的认可等等)(参见Boghossian 2006a)

正如 Wright 注意到的,Boghossian 从相对主义者引出认知相对主义者的过程是为了简化:

Boghossian 的论点没办法变得非常严格,像“证据E使得相信B是合理的”这样的表述可以是正确或错误的——尽管只是相对而言这样。

此外,Wright 论述道,Boghossian在谈及认知相对主义时有一点没法解释——他们没法区分:

  1. 在某一标准下做一个判断。
  2. 判断这些标准适用于这些判断。

(参见MacFarlane (2008b),里面涉及到更多对Boghossian的吐槽)

理性的概念本身以及理性所包含的逻辑和论证内涵都是常见的用于区分不同认知体系的基本原则。
当要区分不同的认知体系时,对理性这一概念的解释以及理性所包含的逻辑和论证内涵都是常见的区分原则。下面我们会分点讨论如何把这些角度都“相对化”

4.4.1 相对主义和理性

4.4.2 相对主义在逻辑

4.4.3 相对主义在科学

4.4.4 论社会建构

EIE4512 Mid-term Review

Week 1 bits and intensity

  • spatial resolution
  • interpolation

Week 2 Contrast Stretching

  • gamma (choose a filter for image)
  • histogram (pseudo code and api)
  • contrast
  • dynamic range (num of distinct intensity of an image)
  • cumulated histogram (from dynamic range) equalization
  • given different cumulated histogram, choose the curve of equalization

Week 3 Histogram Matching

  • how to match a histogram
  • linear spatial filter (correlation and convolution)
  • under what condition correlation and convolution are the same?
  • smoothing (lowpass: gaussian, average, medium…) and sharping (highpass, high boost, )

Week 4 Fourier Transformation / IFT

  • impulse train
  • sampling theorem (the frequency of sampling should be two times of …)
  • DFT / IDFT (given one function to calculate the DFT/IDFT)
  • no matter IDFT and IFT will result in complex, spectrum, log, magnitude/phase angle
  • translation insensitive, rotation sensitive
  • filters (ideal lowpass, Butterworth, gaussian, corresponding highpass filters)

Week 5 Image Restoration

  • degradation model, the formula of additive noise
  • noise distribution
  • mean filter (contra-harmonic, salt and pepper)
  • for example given a salt noise, how to define a contra-harmonic filter
  • alpha-trim filter, when will become mean filter
  • adaptive filter (local, three situation and different situation)
  • given example of local variance and global, which filter should you choose
  • adaptive medium filter
  • bilateral

Week 6 Edge Detection

  • smooth (why should we do smoothing)
  • trade off between localization and detection
  • Hague transformation
  • line detection
  • interest point (which is a good interest point)
  • why we are so interest in the corner detection
  • harris corner detection (familiar with the whole process:loss function/ structure tensor identify what it is)

Week 7 Brightness Consistency Equation

  • brightness consistency equation
  • Lucas – Kanade
  • interactive refinement
    • coarse-to-fine optical flow

6 Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology

this is a reading summary of the book “THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO EPISTEMOLOGY”

It is a defense to the Gettier Problem, by adding extra requirements for JTB to be a knowledge: belief should be true “out of luck”.

The defense says, it is not the way Smith’s think that make the belief to be true.

What do you mean by good luck in Smith’s case?

Because the justification is not “connected” to the fact

Definition

Justification

  1. avails herself of sufficient relevant evidence,
  2. reasonably thorough reflective examination of evidence
  3. the evidence is appropriately connected to the fact
  4. forms a belief on the basis of evident

Luck

  1. justified in believing
  2. the justification is not appropriately connected to the fact
  3. is nevertheless true

Defense

Making sure the justification is appropriately connected! – Difficult (lottery case)

Because the belief is not connected to the fact

Definition

Duncan Pritchard

“A matter of luck that the agents’ belief is true”

Parallel universes, where the belief is not universally true.

Modal epistemology might say that a belief counts as knowledge only if it is true not only in the actual world, but also in a certain proportion of worlds.

Problem

How sufficient is a sufficient proportion?

Distinct way of giving expression to the anti-luck intuition

  • Sensitivity: whether or not the belief is true in fact is not ensured by the way Smith believes — in other words, whether the belief in his mind is sensitive to the truth
  • Safety: under some circumstance, his belief can be just false

Sensitivity Theories

Robert Nozick

test if one’s belief is sensitive to truth: considering the nearest possible world in which p is false, and consider if S still believes that p. Only sensitive belief could be knowledge

Robert Nozick (revised)

S knows that p iff:

  1. p is true
  2. S believes p via believe M
  3. if p weren’t true and S were to use M to infer that p is not true; and
  4. if p were true and S were to use M to infer that p is true.

Keith DeRose (argues)

Safety Theories

Even in the parallel universe of the same situation, Smith’s belief could be false due to some other reason.

Ernest Sosa

belief is safe iff: S would believe that p only if it were so that p

(updated)

If S knows a contingent proposition, p , then if in most nearby possible worlds using the same way to form the belief, S believes that p only when p is true

(even stronger)

if S knows a contingent proposition, p, then in nearly all (if not all) nearby possible …

Quiz

The difference between safety theory and sensitivity theory.

Safety theories and sensitivity theories are both moral epistemic theory to specify “how sufficient the proportion of the other world to have the connection of the belief/justification and the truth, that can made the belief knowledge”

But two theories work in different direction:

  • in sensitivity theories, they discussed the nearby worlds where the belief is false and analyses the justification of the protagonist in that case.
  • in safety theories, they discussed the (most of) nearby possible worlds where S still believes in p, and if the belief is still true in that case.

GEB2004 期中总结

我和世界的interaction,使得我形成了belief,那些被认为好的belief会被称之为knowledge。

为什么要这样的认可?

因为主观和客观总是有距离的。我的belief和世界的fact亦是有距离的。人作为群居动物,需要这样的共识,需要identify好的source of information。knowledge is such a mark for “good information”, or “good belief”

我们如何认可一个belief是一个knowledge?

That’s theory of knowledge

So what is knowledge?

1. Gettier Problem

一个关于什么是Knowledge的波澜

Knowledge 是一个在日常生活中广泛运用,后来才变成术语的概念。

之前大家认为一个belief是knowledge的criteria是:

  • belief
  • justified
  • true

两个Gettier提出的反例(Gettier’s cases):

  • 求职的Smith
  • 福特汽车的故事

其他关于Gettier Problem的case(Gettier’s case) 大概还有几十个吧。

2. Skepticism

也许没有知识可言?

我需要首先知道自己不是一个BIV(缸中之脑)才能知道自己有没有手

可是我不会知道我是不是BIV啊!

Modus tollens

额外:关于epistemology上的学术讨论

往往都是围绕Gettier case的讨论

3. Peer disagreement

如何考虑自己和别人认识上差异的

几个理论:

  • 取平均
  • 死活不听
  • 我要是很确定的话,就应该坚持
  • 两边都不应该继续那么相信

4. Externalism 和 Internalism

一个justification从何而来,发自内心的认同justification是不是重要?

Definition

Internalism: One should know the justification from their inside. (understand the justification in heart, perhaps a higher order of personal justification)

Externalism: That is an unnecessary requirement, which may resulted in skepticism. (may result in endless loop in seeking for justification?)

5. Reliabilism

只要你的justification看起来很reliable就够了

Reliabilism 是 Externalism 的一个case

Generality Problem: 一个reliabilism的致命问题

Reliabilism的形成过程是否有一个unique的归因?毕竟他们可能包含不同的reliability啊!

这个分类的原则必须要确定,否则reliablism就没法玩了。

6. Anti-luck epistemology

分析为什么Gettier Case不是knowledge而只是luck

knowledge不应该是due to luck的

可以讨论平行宇宙(其他nearby world)中的情况,来以此分析luck

为什么上述case is due to luck? What does “luck” imply?

  • sensitivity theory: 在别的世界中要是这个belief是false的呢?
  • safety theory: belief要是在别的世界还是true,belief是不是始终不变呢?

分歧:是不是necessary bala-bala。。。

7. Fundationlism

Fundationlism and Coherentism are theories of the structure of epistemic justification – how can a knowledge be justified.

8. Coherentism

Similar to the above topic.

9. Contextualism

The truth condition of knowledge attributions vary with the contexts in which the knowledge attribution is made.

10. Epistemic Justification

How to justify

11. Experimental Epistemology

 

12. Feminist Epistemology